Editorial Reviews. Review. ” Westerhoff’s commentary is lucid, philosophically engaging, and included ample references for the serious student of Indian or. The Dispeller of Disputes This page intentionally left blank The Dispeller of Disputes N¯ag¯arjuna’s Vigrahavy¯avar. The Dispeller of Disputes – Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani — translated and commented by Jan Westerhoff · A short work by the.
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Emptiness and Reasons [17—19, 68] For as perception, the epistemic instrument, is empty because of the emptiness of all things, in the same way inference, likeness, and testimony are also empty because of the emptiness of all things. Imagine the integers arranged on a line with zero in the middle, the positive integers to the left and the negative integers to the right. Top Reviews Most recent Top Reviews. In this way, the theory of emptiness swallows up key concepts of Buddhist thought and only returns impotent, convention-based substitutes.
The Dispeller of Disputes: Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani
At best the substance of some things is refuted, but not that of the thesis of universal emptiness. They are still able to play the key roles in epistemology usually ascribed to them. Perception is not established by something else, by inference, likeness, or testimony; inference by perception, likeness, or testimony; likeness by perception, inference, or testimony; testimony by perception, inference, or likeness.
But its removal is perceived. This is because an apprehension of non-existent dependent origination cannot be obtained. These can only take place on the basis of conventional truth. Moreover, supposing that the negation is later and the object of negation earlier is also not successful. The Chinese translation is considerably earlier; it was translated by Vi3 moksa.
But then the objective of the Buddhist path loses much of its weight, since it now appears not to tackle a real problem namely, the problem of the existence of suffering but merely a problem of our own devising the problem that we conceptualize things in a way which makes them appear to have the nature of suffering. So far perception is empty of substance.
But once we have accepted that some objects have their qualities substantially and are therefore not empty, there is no reason to be squeamish about substances in general.
Unfortunately for the opponent, his criticism also works the other way round. Emptiness and Reasons [17—19, 68] 3. All explanatory notes, discussions of variant readings and so forth have been left to the commentary. For a further discussion of this point, see Siderits In this way the auspicious things have an auspicious substance.
The translation is based on the most recent edition of the Sanskrit text Yonezawa If the substance of all things is not to be found anywhere, your assertion which is devoid of substance is not able to refute substance. Asserting such a negation therefore does not serve any practical purpose.
Neither the content nor the meaning of this list of numbers is quite clear. Because the origin of suffering is denied, suffering is denied.
The qualities of buddhahood are something which is not there all the time but which is brought about through the practice of the Buddhist path. The Buddha himself used it as an illustration of the insubstantiality of the objects of perception.
Dispeller of Disputes: Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani – Oxford Scholarship
The Father—Son Analogy [49—50] This would avoid the consequence of their permanence, but the resulting theory of non-causal change is hardly something this Buddhist opponent would want to accept. In this case it is unclear to us which of the two TEXT 35 is the father and which is the son. And because dependent origination is denied, the apprehension of dependent origination is denied.
Here things which have been mentioned in connection with the state of things, as well as off conducive to liberation, have a substance conducive to liberation.
Similarly my speech, which is also without substance because it is dependently arisen, plays a part in establishing the lack of substance of things.
Because even if we do not perceive the heat because of the insulating power of the glove, this heat can still affect other things, it can burn a piece of paper or boil a kettle of water.
But this response has the unwelcome consequence that we now have a hard time explaining why lighting a candle in my room does not remove the darkness in the room next door, but only the darkness immediately surrounding it. Such an argument, however, will only let us move in a circle, since we never go beyond the supposed set of epistemic instruments but merely shift the burden of legitimization from one subset to another.
When we seem to be speaking about the pot in front of us, the pot cannot be the referent, because it is empty. This paragraph is only found in the Tibetan pf Yonezawa