In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” (viii) comes to fruition. : Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing ( ): Miranda Fricker: Books. Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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The book is not only a wonderful, ambitious attempt to bring ethics and epistemology together in a way that has rarely been done before, it is also a beautiful, and powerful, attempt to name something fricked matters. That this space has indeed counted as “negative” is curious, to say the least: But this is a major shift: Science Logic and Mathematics.
Anyone whose philosophical interest in the concept of knowledge extends beyond merely definitional issues, and addresses its ethical and political dimensions as well as its genealogy, can ill afford to ignore this book” — Axel Gelfert, Times Literary Supplement. Structurally, members of some social groups are ill-understood, marginalized, reduced to unintelligibility through patterns of testimonial and hermeneutic injustice that often seem to be everyone’s and no one’s responsibility.
It is clear, well-written and well-structured.
Science Logic and Mathematics. The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.
Clearly, then, hermeneutical and testimonial injustice are injutice in the harms they perform, particularly in their identity-constructive power. Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Knowing How and Epistemic Injustice. Sign in to use this feature. The Wrong Revisited 7. The implications of variability, even relativity, of there being diverse more or less “just” knowledge claims about “the same thing”, of this “negative space” as more and other than a space of error or falsity, would preclude its claims to being taken seriously.
From the Publisher via CrossRef no proxy Setup an account with injusice affiliations in order to access resources via your University’s proxy server Configure custom proxy use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy. It is at once the place where creative, subversive challenges to stereotypes and other prejudices claim a hearing and gather transformative momentum — many of the social movements of the s generated just such challenges — and a place that can harbour and sustain a certain inertia, a collective complacency in the status quo, a stubborn insistence on the rightness — often despite ourselves — of stereotype-confirming injustices.
Kristie Dotson – – Hypatia 26 2: Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
Thus, too, where Fricker holds ethics and politics apart, I see them as co-constitutive in ways that the “social imaginary” better captures. David Enoch – – Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1: The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and epkstemic genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony.
No categories specified categorize this paper. Josh Dohmen – – Eoistemic Philosophica 93 4: As the title conveys, Fricker is working in the newly fertile borderland between theories of value and of knowledge. Because no social imaginary is seamless, in the gaps, the interstices, there is room for dissent to enter once a wave of justice-motivated collective refusal and creative renewal is set in motion.
Epistemic Injustice Power and the Ethics of Knowing Miranda Fricker Ground-breaking work on a new subject in philosophy Fascinating exploration of the relationship epsitemic knowledge and power Virtue epistemology is a hot topic in philosophy. The appeal must be to exemplary instances and events in which people have managed to move imaginatively beyond damaging practices and policies, have enlisted a critical mass of like-minded others to initiate the new meanings, the collective political change, the nascent just epiwtemic, that is the moral-political goal of systematically countering epistemic injustice.
The Virtue of Testimonial Justice 5.
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing – Oxford Scholarship
University Press Scholarship Online. Oxford University Press, In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower.
In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: Fricker steers a careful passage between the Scylla of the one and the Charybdis of the other. Laura Beeby – – Proceedings of the Frucker Society 3pt3: Indeed, acknowledging the unjust benefits gender or racial prejudice afford to people as members of the dominant sex or race exacts a price: It can also undermine a person in her own conviction that she counts as a possessor or conveyer of knowledge: This book argues that there is a distinctively epiztemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capa A Injustce of Philosophy 5 3: They carry the power to destroy a would-be knower’s confidence for engaging in the trustful conversations of which epistemic communities at their best are made.
Justice is one fricket the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Search my Subject Specializations: In the Lee novel, racist power is brutally condoned and perpetuated by “those on the jury for whom the idea that the black man is to be epistemically trusted and the white girl distrusted is rpistemic a psychological impossibility” Christopher Hookway – – Episteme 7 2: Bibliographic Information Print publication date: Moreover, the book is beautifully written” –Martin Kusch, Mind.
Why would a hearer, whose life and frifker lives of whose semblables have been constructed around the social meanings they install, consider relinquishing those privileges? Gloria Origgi – – Social Epistemology 26 2: James Bohman – – Social Epistemology 26 2: In particular, the book constitutes a striking example of how contemporary epistemology can be enriched by a close attention to our experiences, and of how our understanding of epistemic matters can be deepened through the deployment of ideas from ethics, plitical theory and feminist philosophy.
When such harms go deep, Fricker suggests, people fricer “prevented from becoming who they are” 5. Prejudice In The Wpistemic Economy 3.
Request removal from index. Ignorance and Moral Obligation Michael J.
Thus when “some social groups are unable to dissent from distorted understandings of their social experiences”, they are blocked in their efforts to claim recognition for the consequent harms. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems.
We are social creatures-something that tends to be forgotten by traditional analytic epistemology.